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In this chapter I discuss how a practice-based sensitivity can be used to address big issues and 
‘large scale’ (social) phenomena. This is of importance because practice-based sensitivities 
are often pigeonholed as part of micro-sociology and therefore deemed unsuitable to deal with 
some of the big issues of our time. The chapter starts by contrasting the position of practice-
based approaches vis-à-vis the idea of macro phenomena, levels of reality and localism. I then 
examine three ways in which practice oriented scholars have addressed large phenomena 
namely studying connections in action, examining the global within the local and engaging 
with scalography, the practice of assembling large scale phenomena. For each approach I 
discuss the main affordances and limitations. I conclude that practice theory helps us to 
reconsider what counts as large scale phenomena and contributes to doing away with some 
traditional dichotomies in social science, for example the presumed difference between micro 
and macro, local and global and the misplaced idea that large scale phenomena are better 




In this chapter I will discuss how a practice-based sensitivity can be used to address big issues 
and ‘large scale phenomena’. Examples of big issues include the nature and functioning of the 
financial market, large institutional arrangements, the education system, bureaucracy and the 
future of the planet. The topic is central to the advancement of practice oriented studies. 
Practice-based sensitivities are often pigeonholed as part of micro-sociology and thus deemed 
unsuitable to deal with some of the big issues of our time and of scarce importance outside 
academic circles. How we address ‘large scale phenomena’ is therefore closely related to the 
issue of the relevance of practice-based studies and the practical uses of practice theories.  
In the chapter I will use the terms ‘practice-based studies’, ‘practice approach’, or ‘practice 
lens’ to denote a family of orientations that take practices as central for the understanding of 
organisational and social phenomena. Authors who embrace this orientation suggest that 
matters such as social order, knowledge, institutions, identity, power, inequalities and social 
change result from and transpire through social practices. While they all agree that the study 
of the social needs to start and end with social practices, they use different sensitizing 
theoretical categories, research methods and discursive genres. As I argued elsewhere 
(Nicolini, 2012), I see no merit in trying to reduce this multiplicity in search of a unitary or 
unified theory of practice, and this equally applies to a discussion of how practice-based 
scholars approach large scale phenomena. Accordingly my aim here is not to build a practice-
based theory of big social phenomena or to theorize large scale social phenomena by building 
upon a specific type of theory. Rather, more modestly, I am interested in the different 
methodological and theoretical strategies that authors in the practice-based camp have used to 
address large scale social phenomena. While I do have my own view of what practices consist 
of
i
, I will here simply examine the question from different practice-based vantage points and 
discuss how ‘large phenomena’ transpire amid and emerge through different theories of 
practice. 
I will start my discussion by contrasting the position of practice-based approaches to ‘large 
scale phenomena’ vis-à-vis the idea of macro phenomena, levels of reality and localism. I will 
then critically survey some of the ways in which practice oriented scholars have addressed 
‘large phenomena’ and comment on their affordances and limitations. 
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On ‘large scale phenomena’ and praxeology  
Practice approaches and the ‘macro’: flat ontologies and layered reality   
One of the common characteristics of practice approaches is the belief that concrete human 
activities – with blood, sweat, tears and all – are critical for the study of the production, 
reproduction and change of social phenomena. Pierre Bourdieu, for example, indicated that to 
understand crucial aspects of French society we need look into ordinary settings such as 
kitchens and dining rooms rather than focussing on abstract domains populated with 
structures, functions and the like (Bourdieu, 1984; Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992). Similarly, 
one of the greatest recent social changes in North American history was triggered in the back 
of an old bus by a small number of courageous women and men who refused to leave their 
seats and in so doing interrupted the reproduction of segregation – in practice (Parks and 
Reed, 2000). This theoretical orientation has critical methodological implications. It suggests 
that in our investigation of social matters we need to engage with  real time activity in its 
historical situatedness –although how this should be done constitutes one of the dimensions 
along which different practice approaches diverge.  
More broadly, practice theorists, disagree on how to deal with the issue of scale and the 
traditional distinction between micro and macro social phenomena (Knorr-Cetina and 
Cicourel, 1981). A first distinction exists between practice theorists who embrace a flat 
ontology and others who uphold a more traditional layered view of the social.  
Some, albeit not all, practice theorists adopt a flat ontology and join forces with other  
relational sociologies  that suggest that all social phenomena, small scale and large scale,  are 
constituted through  and experienced in terms of ‘micro’ situations (Ermibayer, 1997). For 
these authors, so called ‘large scale phenomena’ are constituted by and emerge through the 
aggregation of interrelated practices and their regimes of reproduction. The task of social 
scientists is to account for such processes of constitution and reproduction; they also have to 
display these processes in their texts, that is, reassemble the social in front of the eyes of the 
reader, viewer or listener (Latour, 2005).  Authors who embrace a flat ontology caution that 
although practitioners customarily use abstractions to refer to ‘summaries of the distribution 
of different microbehaviors in time and space’ (Collins, 1981: 989) these abstractions and 
summaries do not have causal power and should not be turned into entities with autonomous 
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existence. Social reality has no ‘levels’: when it comes to the social, it is practices all the way 
down. 
Not all practice theorists embrace a flat ontology. Two examples are Bourdieu and Giddens. 
Both authors believe that such things as structure, power and fields exist in their own right, 
although they need to be reproduced in and through practices. A similar stance has been 
adopted by authors such as Fairclough (2005; 2013), who combines an attention for 
(discursive) practices with a critical realist position; and Glynos and Horwarth (2007) who, 
building on a Lacanian sensitivity, suggest that practices are governed by a dialectic of social, 
political and fantasmatic logics – the latter providing an affective explanation of why specific 
practices and regimes grip subjects. Concepts such as structure, field and logics indicate that 
for these authors practices alone are not sufficient to explain social phenomena and the 
constitution of society. 
This ontological position is reflected in conceptions of what counts as large phenomena. 
Authors like Bourdieu, Giddens, Fairclough and others who admit the existence of 
phenomena outside of the realm of practice conceive ‘macro’ social phenomena in terms of 
long-term, complex and far reaching social processes. These processes, which are beyond the 
discretion of any individual, constitute ‘external forces’ which structure people’s daily 
conduct .  As such they should be treated as self-subsistent entities: social classes, the market, 
the state etc. For these authors, such entities need to be explained in terms that are different 
from those used to explain mundane social intercourse; in common parlance they constitute a 
different level of social reality. Micro and macro large scale social phenomena are made of 
different ontological stuff, so to speak. 
Authors who embrace a more relational standpoint, on the contrary, reject this view and 
denounce it as a theoretical sleight of hand. Complexity and size have nothing to do with the 
existence of so called ‘macro’ phenomena, or at least they do not warrant granting such 
phenomena a different ontological status. For one thing, plenty of evidence exists that even 
the most ordinary ‘micro’ situations and discursive interactions are extremely complex and 
intricate. For example, the extensive work of conversation analysis has unearthed a Pandora’s 
box of mechanisms, effort, and skilled performance in even the most mundane of discursive 
interactions. At the same time, social conduct that according to the accepted views are 
considered ‘small scale’ –for example the practice of greeting other people at the beginning of 
a social encounter – are in fact ubiquitous, pervasive and critical to sustain the fabric of social 
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relationships and its orderliness. Indeed, one can hardly think of a phenomenon that is more 
‘macro’ and ‘large scale’ than greetings.  
For authors who subscribe to flat ontology, then, the idea of large phenomena points at issues 
that are highly ramified in time and space and for this reason difficult to grasp and represent. 
From this point of view, the ascription of a special ontological status to ‘large scale 
phenomena’ is a combination of lack of knowledge and frustration with the fact that we are 
unable to get our heads around them. In short, ‘macro sociology’ is a sociology for impatient 
people. 
Not all flat ontologies are equal: individualism, situationalism and relationalism 
Fundamental distinctions also exist among authors who subscribe to a flat ontology.
 
 These 
distinctions are closely related to the praxeological orientations they adopt.  
First, there is a tendency – or maybe a risk – for practice oriented authors to fall back on the 
idea that large scale social phenomena can be explained because people perform or follow 
something that pre-exists them (a logic of action, a praxis, a template for action, a routine).  In 
this view social phenomena arise from the fact that  people perform practices  -- the emphasis 
being on people as in ‘well-formed individuals’ . This position is conducive to an 
overdetermined and over theorised outlook which explains social affairs  in terms of rational 
individual choices  or (more or less successful) efforts  to realize pre-existing rules, plans of 
action or mental schemes (see Schatzki, 1996, 2002 for a discussion).  
Second, a group of authors usually associated with ethnomethodology and its later 
development and diaspora endorse what Knorr Cetina (1981) describes as ‘methodological 
situationalism’. The notion of methodological situationalism adds a critical restrictive 
condition the flat ontology principle that ‘concrete social interactions’ should be considered 
the building blocks for macro-sociological conceptions’ (Knorr Cetina, 1981:  8). The 
supplementary condition is that nothing can be said of what happens beyond  in-situ social 
interactions. From this perspective, the only empirically acceptable objects of 
conceptualization in social investigation are orderly scenes of action taken one at a time; 
nothing can be said outside these restrictive boundaries (Schegloff, 1997; Sarangi and 
Roberts, 1999). In this extreme version, large scale phenomena are not accepted as legitimate 
objects of inquiry per se. Phenomena can be considered large only by virtue of the number of 
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their repetitions and their relevance in sustaining the texture of the social (as in the example of 
greeting which is ubiquitous and critical for society to function).  
In this very narrow interpretation, methodological situationalism risks becoming an instance 
of what Levinson (2005) calls ‘interactional reductionism’. The term foregrounds the risks of 
reducing all social phenomena to self-organizing local interactions. According to Levinson, 
this approach turns the potentially frutiful suggestion that social phenomena are assembled 
amid and through situated practices into an empirical straight jacket. This in turn restricts the 
range of empirical options and practical uses of practice approaches.  
A third group of scholars, to which I belong and that will constitute the focus of the rest of the 
chapter, maintains a form of relational or connected situationalism. The basic intuition that 
distinguishes this group of scholars from the previous one is that the basic unit of analysis is 
not a single scene of action or a specific situation or instance of the accomplishment of a 
practice but rather a chain, sequence or combination of performances plus their relationships -
- what keeps them connected in space and time. From this perspective, which practice 
theorists share with other traditions such as multi-sited ethnography (Marcus, 1995; Falzon, 
2012), social phenomena are effects of and transpire through associations in time and space of 
situated performances. Performances therefore can be understood only if we take into account 
the nexus in which they come into being. What happens here and now and why (the 
conditions of possibility of any scene of action) is inextricably linked to what is happening in 
another ‘here and now’ or what has happened in another ‘here and now’ in the past (and 
sometimes in the future). The study of large scale phenomena from a methodological 
connected situationalism position is predisposed towards rhizomatic sensitivity. A rhizomatic 
sensitivity sees associations of practices as a living connection of performances and what 
keeps them together; it offers an image of how practices grow, expand and conquer new 
territory; it suggests that to study how large phenomena emerge from and transpire through 
connections between practices we should always start from a ‘here and now’ and follow 
connections (Nicolini, 2009); and it finally offers a model for representing the gamut of 
connections in action. As we will see below, depending on the sensitivity of the researcher 
this can take the form of an overview – so that large phenomena appear as textures, nexuses, 
meshes or assemblages of practices –  although this is not inevitable and other options to 
praxeologise large phenomena are also available.  
In summary, from a connected situationalism position the study of large phenomena amounts 
to (a) the investigation of what large rhizomatic assemblages of situated activities look like, 
7 
 
how they come into being, are reproduced and change; and (b) how these evolving 
assemblages are made available and become relevant and consequential in other situated 
activities or assemblages thereof by virtue of being turned into summaries and/or 
representations. How this can be done in practice is the subject of the rest of the chapter. 
Three theory method packages through which to study large scale phenomena from a 
practice-based perspective 
In this section I will examine three practical responses to the question ‘how can we 
understand large scale phenomena using a practice-based sensitivity’? The first builds upon 
and develops what I call textile metaphors (texture, net, fabric, weaving); the second focuses 
on  how the global manifests itself in the local; the third concentrate on the practices through 
which large scale phenomena are assembled. As we shall see, these broad approaches 
constitute what elsewhere I called ‘theory method packages’ (Nicolini, 2012). Although they 
are related in more than one way, these packages embrace slightly different ontological 
assumptions and propose different practical approaches to making sense, studying and 
representing large scale phenomena from a practice-based perspective.    
Large scale phenomena as a fabric of interconnected practices: from metaphor to method 
The first approach, which as we shall see includes some variants, builds  on the work of 
authors who propose that large scale phenomena emerge from and transpire through the living 
and pulsating connections among practices. Schatzki (2015: 4) for example, suggests that 
large phenomena are ‘constellations of practice-arrangement bundles or of slices or features 
thereof’.  The difference between small and large phenomena is essentially one of extension 
and number of the practices involved: ‘A bundle is a set of linked practices and arrangements. 
A constellation is a set of linked bundles… the kinds of link that exist among bundles are the 
kinds of link that connect practices and arrangements. A constellation, consequently, is just a 
larger and possibly more complex bundle, a larger and possibly more complex linkage of 
practices and arrangements’ (Schatzki, 2011: 8). Gherardi (2012) mobilises the image of 
texture (and sometimes web) to capture the interconnected nature of practices.  According to 
her, fields of practices ‘arise in the interwoven texture that interconnects practices’ (Gherardi, 
2012:131) and extend all the way to society. The concept of texture is used in an evocative 
way ‘to convey the image of shifting the analysis between studying practices from the inside 
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and the outside’ (Gherardi, 2012: 2)  and ‘to follow the connections in action and 
investigating how action connects and disconnects’ (ibid :156). Czarniawska (2004) similarly 
uses the image of the action net to achieve the same result. Large social phenomena such as 
institutions, business organizations and regional waste prevention programs are conceived as the 
result of weaving actions together and stabilizing the resulting arrangement, inscribing it in text, 
bodies and artefacts (Lindberg and Czarniawska; 2006; Corvellec and Czarniawska, 2014).  The 
concepts of texture and action net are thus meant to capture both the connectivity and the work 
that goes into establishing and maintaining these ties. As with Schatzki, the view is that large 
phenomena are made of a complex web of living connections between practices. 
Concepts such as net, network, web, bundle, texture, confederation, congregation, assemblage, 
mesh and ecology are often used by practice oriented authors (and other relational social 
scientists) to describe how practices work together. All these metaphors conjure and promote the 
idea that large social phenomena emerge from the interconnection of social and material practices 
and evoke the image of a pulsating yet seemingly chaotic anthill-like world. However, these 
concepts are often used figuratively rather than analytically. While authors nurture the imaginaire 
of a world made of practices they offer relatively few pragmatic indications of how we could 
make sense of it or approach the study of such a world empirically. In short, the issue is how to 
operationalize this imaginaire in ways of seeing and writing.  
  
Uncovering the interconnection between practices through systematic analysis 
Among the few authors who have offered a practical way to study and represent inter-connections 
among practices and their effects are Stephen Kemmis and his colleagues (Kemmis, 2005; 
Kemmis 2010; Kemmis, & Mutton, 2012; Kemmis et al, 2014).  In a number of works spanning a 
decade these authors have developed a sophisticated grammar and set of methodological 
principles to understand and represent practices and their ecologies.  Kemmis and colleagues 
conceive of practices as socially established cooperative human activities composed of the 
hanging together of saying, doings and social relatings.  These activities are organised around 
projects, and by virtue of being reproduced in time they assume the character of practice-
traditions. When participants engage in activities in the pursuit of projects, they do the things 
and they speak the language that are characteristic of the practice and enter relationships 
building on the ‘memory’ provided by the practice-tradition. Critically, however, doings, 
saying and relating only become intelligible within the pre-existing set of cultural-discursive, 
material economic and social-political conditions. Such conditions both enable the unfolding 
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of a practice (the practice memory, for example, is sedimented in the physical arrangements, 
language spoken, discourse used etc.) and constrain them (they establish what can be said and 
done). Kemmis and colleagues call this intersubjective space, ‘the architecture of practice’ –in 
effect, Kemmis’ Habermasian reinterpretation of Schatzki ‘orders’. To paraphrase Marx, 
people bring practices into being but not under conditions of their own choosing.  However in 
contrast to the traditional Marxian interpretation, the relationship between practices and 
architectures is two-way (Schatzki, 2005 calls this a contextural relationship).When practices 
happen they become part of the happening: they take up available doings, saying and relating, 
they modify them and they leave behind traces that in turn become part of the practice 
architecture of future activities. Activities and the architectures within which they unfold are 
therefore shaped by other practices and their architectures, and in turn shape them. Practices 
thus ‘feed upon each other’ (Kemmis et al, 2014: 47) and in so doing constitute  ecologies 
understood as ‘‘distinctive interconnected webs of human social activities that are mutually-
necessary to order and sustain a practice as a practice of a particular kind and complexity (for 
example, a progressive educational practice)’ (Kemmis and Mutton 2012, p 15). 
Kemmis and colleagues use this detailed theoretical construction to develop an empirical 
method to analyse practices and to study how they combine into large phenomena. They do so 
by providing an analytical tool (in the shape of an analysis checklist) for examining individual 
practices in terms sayings, doings and relatings, their project and the architecture amid which 
the practice unfolds. The same categories are then used to compare how different practices 
influence, enable or constrain each other and to examine how one practice ‘feeds upon’, ‘is 
inter-connected with’, or shapes or is shaped by other practices and whether the relationship is 
one of hospitability, symbiosis or suffocation (all these terms are used in Kemmis et al, 2014 
ch.3). The result of this second type of analysis is a two-ways table that allows investigators 
to examine, for example, how the practice of student learning is shaped by teaching, teacher 
learning, leadership processes etc. It might be, for example, that exposing teachers to the 
practice of democratic and participative forms of school leadership creates a hospitable 
condition for specific active and participative teaching practices that in turn affects the 
practice of student learning.  The table also helps show how student learning influences other 
practices. We thus find that the teacher’s practices are reflexively shaped by her observations 
and interpretations of how students respond to her teaching, and that positive changes in the 
practices of student reinforce the utilisation of democratic learning practices and initiatives at 
School district level.  
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The analytical ‘table of invention’ (a term underscoring its heuristic use) aims to support the 
empirical mapping, with some level of systematicity, of relationships between practices in 
specific parts of the ecology. Although in the existing practical examples the approach and the 
‘sequential, systematic and repeated’ empirical analysis are limited to a specific part of the 
ecology, Kemmis is adamant that the same principle applies everywhere: ‘the educational 
practices in the Education Complex are not vast ‘social structures’ that order the world 
uniformly throughout a classroom, school, School District or national jurisdiction. On the 
contrary, they are realised in everyday interactions between people, and between people and 
other objects, in millions of diverse sites around the world’ (Kemmis et al, 2014, p.52). While 
ecological relationships may turn out to be more complex and less linear that this 
combinatorial approach suggests (Kemmis et al, 2012 begins to explore how principles from 
biological system theory can be brought into the discussion), the basic approach remains 
valid: if the world is flat, large scale social phenomena can be examined in terms of mutual 
relationship among practices. 
Studying large scale phenomena by rhizomatically following connections between trans-
situated practices 
The work by Kemmis and colleagues has the advantage of enabling empirical analysis by 
making concrete the idea that large social phenomena are the result of nets, large 
confederations, and vast ecologies of practices tied together. It also offers a practical way of 
investigating them. One may not agree with Kemmis’ approach, which can be accused of being a 
bit mechanical and simplistic, recycling several elements of old style systems theory (via the 
action research tradition from which Kemmis derives). However, Kemmis’ work sheds light on 
what is at stake when using  metaphors like web and net to study large phenomena from a 
praxeological perspective. For example, one of the things that becomes clear is that such  
metaphors are especially suitable for situations where there is direct interaction and contact 
among practices and their human and non-human carriers.  However, this approach is not well  
suited  to studying the increasing number of social phenomena that are global in scope and do not 
embrace direct interaction  (or even prohibit it, as in the terrorist movement studies by Knorr 
Cetina, 2005). The challenge is to find ways of studying such phenomena that hold fast to the idea 
that practices are always social and materially situated and involve real time empirically 
observable scenes of action analogous to Bourdieu’s French dining room mentioned above. This 
can be done if we reconceptualise the notion of interdependence – expanding the variety of ways 
in which practices can influence each other – and replace a textile view (based on metaphors of 
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web and net) and research strategy with a rhizomatic approach. Progress in this sense has been 
made by a group of scholars who substitute the idea of web, net and network with the idea of 
nested relationality (Jarzabkowski et al, 2015), trans-situatedness (Nicolini et al. 2015) and 
complex global micro structures (Knorr Cetina, 2005; 2009). These authors offer a futher way to 
translate in practice the assumption  that large scale phenomena emerge from and transpire 
through connections among practices which differs from that proposed by Kemmis and 
associates. The idea in this case is that a number of large scale social phenomena emerge from  
active relationships between highly localized forms of activities that take place in dispersed places 
and time zones. What keeps these distant local practices in a nexus of connections  is not some 
superordinate form of coordination such as that exerted by NATO. Rather, the connectivity stems 
from the nature and fabric of the practice itself. A concrete example will help to explain what is at 
stake here. 
Jarzabkowski et al (2015) have utilized this approach to study the global market of re-insurance –
that is, the place where insurance companies buy insurance policies for themselves. Using a 
zooming in and out research strategy (Nicolini, 2009; 2012) they patiently followed the practice 
of reinsurance, studying it in (extreme) depth in the five main global hubs where it unfolds 
through highly situated activities (meetings, conversation, calculations in offices, restaurants, 
parties). In each hub, they identified the practices through which consensus prices emerge, risk is 
modelled and trades are finalized. Among other things, they discovered that what makes this vast 
nexus of diverse elements and competing trades function as a recognizable market is that each of 
these practices constitutes the context for each other – first locally first and later trans-locally. The 
complex web of relationality that they patiently unravel is sustained through practitioners’ 
membership of the same community of practice and utilization of specific scoping technologies 
(i.e., technologies that summarize the instant state of the market on a screen and allow at the same 
to intervene in it: see Knorr Cetina, 2005). Most important  maintenance of the web also depends 
on the organizing effect afforded by (1) collective sharing by traders of the same set of practical 
understandings, that is, the know-hows that govern ordinary activities such as arriving at a quote 
in the absence of a centralized market or dealing with large adverse events; (2) the circulation of 
the same general understanding  of how the network of relationships works, why and what is 
legitimate and acceptable within this particular regime of practice; and (3) the specific 
temporalities inscribed in and re-produced by the collective practice –e.g. periodical renewal dates 
punctuating the process which provide specific time horizons for the different activities and 
constitute an objects towards which the gamut of activities converge and precipitate. Unlike other 
markets where participants are connected through embodied presence (e.g., a traditional trading 
room full of screaming brokers) or response presence (e.g., modern trading floors where the 
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market is transformed into moving indexes on a computer screen to which human traders or non-
human trading algorithms react), here we have a global market that which is built on a form of 
relational presence. In short, the market is brought into existence because the practices of 
underwriters are relational to one another, and collective activities are coordinated by virtue of 
being part of a same practice, despite the lack of spatial co-presence. 
The approach is very promising in that it makes such relations tangible and further develops the 
idea that understanding and representing large scale phenomena requires a reiteration of two basic 
movements: zooming in on the situated accomplishments of practice, and zooming out to their 
relationships in space and time (Nicolini, 2009; 2012). This approach can be extended to 
phenomena that have a broad, even global breadth. The approach also invites us to expand the 
palette of methods through which we interrogate how these relationships are established, 
maintained and consumed beyond the transactional ‘quid pro quo’ principle that is built, for 
example, in Latour’s notion of interessement (2005).  General understandings, for example, 
connect practices mainly through discursive mediation and operate at a level that is both rational 
and affective. As authors like Laclau and Mouffe (1985) convincingly argue, discourse can 
govern and bring together practice at a distance through structuring the field of intelligibility and 
the related demands that this makes on upon social identities, relationships and systems of 
knowledge and belief – a case in point being the construction of national identity and other 
imagined communities (Anderson, 1983). Much of this takes place at a level that is affective 
rather than rational and builds on the power of preconscious drives and impulses such as the sense 
of lack and incompleteness built into the fabric of individualization (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985). 
The point has been highlighted by Karin Knorr-Cetina (2005) who studied complex global 
micro structures -- structures which similarly to the reinsurance market above are driven by 
micro-interactions but are global in reach. Asking how the fragmentary kaleidoscope of often 
unconnected cells of Al Qaeda make for a global movement, she draws attention to the 
transcendent sense of temporality shared by affiliates (a temporality that transcends individual 
life and survival and that implies waiting, patience and preparedness); the use of media to 
communicate to the rest of the diaspora (terrorist attacks are also messages with a strong 
sensory, affective and motivating intent); and the strategic use of the narrative of an ongoing 
and  persistent  confrontation between a religiously deﬁned Arabic diaspora and various 
Western empires (Karin Knorr-Cetina, 2005: 23). Al Qaeda as a global large scale 
phenomenon thrives on the principle of nested relationality and can only be studied by 
zooming in on its practices and following connections, provided we are prepared to think of 
such connections in much broader terms than in some current practice-based approaches.  
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In summary, the concepts of practice architecture, nested relationality and the related 
methodological principles of examining mutual influences between practices in situ and of 
tracking distant connections among local practices following human, material and discursive 
intermediaries, constitute a first practical answer to the question of how can we represent 
large scale phenomena from a practice-based perspective. The two strategies are 
complementary in that they operationalise the textile metaphors often used to conceptualise 
large phenomena from a practice perspective. They do so by holding fast to the ideas that 
practices are always manifest in empirically accessible social sites of activity (as this is how 
they perpetuate themselves) and that explaining how practices form constellations and wider 
configurations does not require presupposing the existence of mysterious superordinate 
entities. Trans-situated practices are connected through other practices such as those of 
visiting, writing and circulating artefacts; writing blogs to proselytise on the internet etc.  We 
can thus understand the global using the same approach we use to examine the local.   
Examining the global in the local  
A second practical answer to the question of how can we represent large scale phenomena 
from a practice-based perspective is by focussing on how the global manifests itself in the 
local. In effect, the methodological movement in this case is complementary to the one used 
by the approaches above: rather than building on an inside-out strategy whereby researchers 
move from one locale to another  until a ‘global’ overview emerges, here the focus is on how 
the global itself manifests in ordinary practices. As I discussed above, this view extends the 
intuition of ethnomethodology and conversational analysis by following sequences of action 
and talk in interaction beyond the boundaries of the specific scene of action (or text) under 
examination. The goal is to understand how the practical understandings, discursive resources 
and member categorizations used to accomplish practices in a specific locale are re-produced 
in time – rather than limiting exploration to their rules of application. 
This approach has been developed into an explicit investigation strategy by Scollon and 
Scollon (2001; 2004; 2005), who call it ‘nexus analysis’. These authors, who build on the 
insights of discourse analysis, think of large scale phenomena in analogy to large scale 
discursive formations or ‘big D Discourses’ (Gee, 1999). Discourses here are understood as 
the conditions that bestow a certain order and meaning on the statements which belong to it. 
Discursive formations, such as medicine, ethnicity, modern science or being a rock musician 
(or fan) were obtained by assembling existing discursive and non-discursive elements in a 
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novel way through the institutions of new social and discursive practices. These large 
discursive formations are socially constitutive in that they enact social identities, relationships 
between people, and bodies of knowledge. While most discourse analysts limit their focus on 
statements, text and how they are assembled and produced for the Scollons semiosis 
necessarily spills over beyond texts and into the world. Discursive formations provide the 
conditions for the accomplishment of all activities, not only discourse. In turn, discursive 
formations are socially and materially reproduced through the very conditions that they 
institute. Nexus analysis is the investigation of the forms of discursivity that circulate through 
specific sites of practice and which lead to the emergence of specific mediated actions and 
regimes of activity, for example doing a class or appearing in court  
In detail, the analysis starts by examining a specific site of engagement (a time/space station 
where some practice is customarily reproduced) with special attention given to the social 
arrangements (interactional orders), the historical bodies of the participants (their lived 
experiences) and the discourses that are active in that particular scene, (the discourses toward 
which participants’ attention appear to be directed). Analysis of the site of engagement and of 
mediated actions there enables the crucial discourses that operate in the scene to be identified. 
This is, however, only part of the task. The next step of the analysis consists of navigating 
between these discourses ‘as a way of seeing how those moments are constituted out of past 
practices and how in turn they lead to new forms of action…’(Scollon and Scollon, 2004, 
p.29). This is achieved by ‘circumferencing’ the existing cycles of discourse (and practices),  
examining their historical origin and showing how they constitute local action through 
anticipating consequences and providing motives. Key to this task is the idea that discourse 
mutates in time through what Iedema calls ‘resemiotization’ (Iedema, 2001; 2003) and the 
deliberate use of different time scales by the researcher 
The idea of resemiotization captures the process through which discourses are progressively 
materialised from situated and quite ‘local’ talk towards increasingly durable – because they 
are written, multiplied and filed – forms of language use (Iedema, 2003, p.42). When 
introduced into a different scene of action these durable manifestations of discourse are re-
performed locally. For example, it may be decided (talk) to organise a focus group on certain 
social policies, and to invite a number of heads of household. The decision is then 
resemiotised in an invitation letter (text) that is sent to male addressees or householders (who 
are very often male). These people accept the invitation and participate in the focus group 
(talk). The site of engagement actively reproduces a gender bias that is brought to bear by a 
cycle of discourse. The gender-based discourse is both manifested in and perpetuated through 
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the nexus of practice: the  ‘focus group’. The situation is compounded by the fact that male 
participants are likely carry into the scene historical bodies/ideas that predispose them to 
perceive themselves as the family spokesperson (even if they are not necessarily the actual 
breadwinner). The two cycles of discourse render participants doubly blind to the gendered 
nature of the practice. They do not see this gendering and they do not see the discourse that 
makes them not see.  Retracing the multiple socio-historical chains of resemiotization, it is 
critical to uncover ‘how and why what we confront as ‘real’ has come about through networks 
of transmission and assemblage of semiotic resources (Iedema, full refibid. p.48). Nexus 
analysis therefore provides an understanding of which discourses circulate in any form of 
practice and accounts for how such large scale discursive formations are reproduced. 
Critical to this endeavour is also the deliberate deployment and manipulation of different time 
scales, the assumption being that when we change the temporality taken into account in our 
investigation, different types of phenomena become noticeable. For example, Scollon (2005) 
lists a number of cycles within which different aspects of human existence are entrained: 
respiratory cycles; metabolic and digestive cycles; circadian cycles of waking and sleeping; 
lunar cycles; solar cycles and the seasons; entropic cycles, and the formation and decay of 
material substances. The list, which is not meant to be exhaustive (for example, it does not 
include socially produced temporalities and cycles), is only a reminder that what counts as 
relevant and consequential changes depending upon which temporal horizon we employ. 
Large scale phenomena need to be made – they are not given – and what counts as large is 
very much an effect of our interests and practical concerns. 
Studying scalography and playing with it 
A further way to answer the question of how can we represent large scale phenomena from a 
practice-based perspective is to address them directly through the idea of scalography 
(Hinchliffe, 2009). This third way is rather different from the two strategies examined above .  
Scalography refers in fact to the sceptical ethnographic study of scalar objects and practices, 
that is, the study of practices through which large scale phenomena are constructed. 
Scalography can be used in a literal or in a reflexive way.  
Used literally, scalography is the study of the scoping technologies (Knorr Cetina, 2005) and 
representation activities through which specific classes of practitioners construct and circulate 
‘large scale phenomena’.  Practitioners in several scientific domains use all manners of 
‘summaries of the distribution of different microbehaviors in time and space’ (Collins, 1981: 
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989). These abstractions are expertly created for specific practical uses: guiding an army, 
controlling a city, producing a news bulletin, making policy or investment decisions.  They 
are manufactured through ordinary practices and mobilised in centres of calculation such as 
control rooms, military command centres, news rooms, boardrooms of large corporations etc. 
(Latour, 2005). From this point of view, large scale phenomena exist only as the object of 
work in specific occupations. To understand large scale phenomena, defined in these terms, it 
makes sense to investigate the ordinary work of those who produce overviews, vistas and 
summaries of distributions This can be done for example by attending to the creation of 
mobile intermediaries, following their circulation, and examining the assembling powers of 
skilled humans and scopic technologies (Callon and Latour, 1981; Knorr Cetina, 2005). 
Because such work is concrete and localised, we can apply one of the two strategies discussed 
above to investigate in which buildings, bureaus or departments large phenomena were and 
are manufactured and how this works. While the study of the practices through which macro 
phenomena are brought into being and differences of scale are produced is not specific to 
practice theory (the topic has been examined extensively by both STS and Actor network 
theory: see Latour, 200;   Hinchliffe, 2009), how these themselves are examined is new. 
Scalography however can also be used in an intentional yet  reflexive way. As I suggested 
above, for practice-based studies and cognate approaches the problem is not that large 
phenomena are manufactured and used, but rather that this process is hidden from view, 
ignored or forgotten so that the map is confused with the territory. Social scientists are 
perfectly entitled to create partial, thumbnail abstracted representations of large phenomena 
for practical use as long as they do this in plain view and don’t sever the link between 
representational practice and practice represented. In this sense, we can study large scale 
phenomena by taking the regular performances of a large number of similar activities across 
time and space as the object of interest. We can attribute a collective name to a number of 
individual instances and treat the resulting epistemic object as quasi-entity: for example, the 
‘macro practice’ or ‘practical regime’ of showering, shopping in supermarkets, washing, 
teaching, cycling and trading in the market (all cases discussed in Shove, Pantzar and Watson, 
2012). Such representational and processual quasi-entities can then be used to construct 
narratives of growth, survival and disappearance at a large spatial and temporal scale. The 
critical reflexive step is refrain from granting such quasi-entities direct causal power . 
Growth, competition and disappearance must also be explained by reference to specific 
events, local conditions and ordinary practices. This manoeuvre, which has been successfully 
adopted by a number of practice oriented scholars (see, e.g., Warde, 2005; Shove, Pantzar and 
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Watson, 2012; Shove and Spurling, 2013), lends itself to studying  the relative success of 
practices in terms of competition for practitioners (their time and attention) and other 
resources ‘consumed’ by the practice. We can thus explain why showering seems to have won 
the competition with bathing, at least in most Western countries, by focussing on how an 
incremental changes of techniques, know-how, and ways of understanding bodily cleanliness 
came together to ‘created a space for showering to challenge the previously dominant way of 
doing bodily cleansing (that is bathing)’ (Southerton,  Warde, and Hand, 2004: 42). By 
focussing on the particular connections between the ‘infrastructural, technological, rhetorical, 
and moral positioning of showering visa-a visa bathing’ (Hand , Shove and Southerton, 2005 
:15) the approach provides an alternative, practice-based explanation of the process  of 
‘diffusion’  and how local innovations turn into large scale phenomena. It also leaves plenty 
of room for, and in fact invites us to take into account, individual calculation (costs), social 
mechanism (imitation and fashions) and affective as well as preconscious elements (for 
example the subsconscious interpellation of cleanliness associated with late modernity: see 
Leader, 2002). By the same token, the approach also allows us to reason in terms of alliances, 
mutual support between practices and their components and even competitive appropriation. 
For example, the rapid success of car mobility can be explained by the fact that cars first 
shared and then appropriated (or ‘stole’) skills, material forms and even spaces that belonged 
to competing systems of mobility: horse carts, cycles and in certain case buses and train 
(Urry, 2004; Shove, Pantzar and Watson, 2012). Finally and most important, the approach can 
be offered to practitioners who can use it to question regimes, ask how they were established, 
what different arrangements are possible and what it would take to transition to them. All this 
is at a level of detail that is compatible with practitioners’ daily experience and that they can 
therefore grasp.  
In summary, by partially ‘entifying’ practices themselves and becoming reflexive 
scalographers, practice-oriented scholars open the possibility of studying practices in ways 
that are precluded by the other two approaches. We can thus learn interesting things by 
counting the frequency and variation of practices in time and across locales and studying them 
historically –something that other approaches struggle to do. This approach has the benefit of 
making room for contradictions, conflicts and tensions in the study of practices, all elements 
that tend to disappear when large phenomena are built from the bottom up as in the strategies 
described in the two previous sections (see Kwa, 2001 for a discussion).  It, however, is not 
without its own risks. One of the main challenges facing this third strategy is to maintain a 
consistently reflexive attitude towards what is only ever temporary ‘entification’. It is easy to 
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slip between the step of constructing practices as analytical objects to reifying them as a 
‘thing with boundaries’.. Questions about “What is practice?” and “What are its limits?” soon 
emerge, mostly because we are so bad at dealing with performances (instead of entities). The 
solution is to move quickly into Mrs & Mr Bourdieu’s dining room and ask “in which 
building did it happen?” and “who did it”. In short it is important not to get lost in this 
complex game of foregrounding and backgrounding and to remember that it is a game of our 
own making.  
Concluding remarks 
Let’s return to the initial issue of how a practice-base sensitivity can be used to address big 
issues and ‘large scale phenomena’ The above discussion suggests that the question admits 
multiple related answers, even among practice-oriented scholars who subscribe to a relational 
and flat ontology (Ermibayer, 1997). Taken together these answers, which very often can be 
used in combination, suggest that adopting a practice – based orientation offers some specific 
affordances vis-à-vis competing or cognate orientations. 
First, practice-based approaches join forces with other relational sociologies  and invite us to 
rethink certain entrenched distinctions starting with the idea that micro and macro phenomena 
can be cleanly distinguished.  Big issues exist, of course, but big issues do not necessarily 
concern large scale phenomena, and not all large scale phenomena are big issues. Large scale 
phenomena do not necessarily happen in places that are different from where ‘small’ ones 
occur. Presence and distance are not opposed and are only occasionally concerned with space 
and time. Large scale and global phenomena are not always things that can be seen from 
space.  
Second, practice-based approaches suggest that large phenomena are made and that 
differences in scale are produced in practice and through practices. They also invite us to 
manipulate, play, and experiment with different methods of scale-making.  The advantage of 
practice approaches vis-à-vis other theoretical sensitivities stems from its capacity to use more 
than one scale at the same time and to skilfully move between them.   The challenge is how to 
conceive, talk and investigate large phenomena without letting old views return by the 
backdoor. The actors we encounter in our explorations also use abstract/vague entities such as 
‘culture’ or ‘the spirit of the times’ to account for concrete activities. We therefore need to be 
vigilant and to refrain from colluding with them in believing that these abstractions are 
anything other than convenient summaries. This does not mean that ‘these abstractions and 
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summaries do not do anything’ as suggested by Collins (1981: 989). Abstractions such as 
‘energy consumption’ and ‘leadership’ in fact do a lot of work, for example, in parliament, in 
the stock market and in workplaces all over. Moreover their capacity to produce effects is 
related to their assumed correspondence to what they summarise. Our job is not to denounce 
them as false idols but rather to ask through what practices and technologies of representation 
were they produced, in which observable scenes of actions were these summaries created and, 
most important, what effects do they produce when deployed in practice?  
Finally, practice-based approaches allow us to abandon the idea that producing big abstract 
theories is the only way to study large scale phenomena. On the contrary, much is to be 
gained from resisting the temptation to study types of large phenomena as such
ii
 –. 
Accordingly, the objects of inquiry for practice-based approaches are not the financial market 
or schooling in the abstract but rather the market of reinsurance at the turn of the millennium 
or the school system in Alaska or in Australia. As soon as we set out to study ‘the market’ or 
‘institutions’ or ‘the state’ in abstract theoretical terms (even if we use the word practice a 
thousand times), we abandon a practice oriented project and start doing something else. In the 
words of Collins (1981) ‘sociological concepts can be made fully empirical only by 
grounding them in a sample of the typical micro-events that make them up (p.988)’.  
There are many good reasons for following this advice, but at least two in particular are worth 
mentioning here. First, there is increasing evidence that the idea that good social science is a 
science of abstract entities and systems is simply a symptom of what in jest we could call 
‘economics envy’ or ‘Parson’s disease’. As Heuts and Mol (2013) nicely put it, ‘crafting a 
rich theoretical repertoire… does not work by laying out solid abstracting generalisations, but 
rather by adding together ever shifting cases and learning from their  specificities’ (p.127). 
Second, the type of representations produced by practice-based approaches are what 
practitioners often ask for. While practitioners at times make use of abstract concepts in 
making sense of problematic situations and charting new and unknown territories, they are 
always thirsty for descriptions of their daily practical concerns. This is because practitioners 
learn from others through hints, tips and examples; practitioners are always on the lookout for 
ideas and nuggets of wisdom that they can steal. Practice theory thus allows us to produce 
representations that practitioners can then use to talk about their own practice – and to thereby 
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i
 I think of social practices in terms of orderly regimes of mediated material and discursive activities that are 
aimed at identifiable objects and have a history, a constituency and a normative and affective dimension. For 
reasons of space I will not discuss or defend this stipulation in the present text. Readers are referred to other texts 
where I do so (Nicolini, 2012; Nicolini and Monteiro, 2016).  
ii
 I am in debt to Pedro Monteiro for this observation. 
 
 
 
